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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF -UTAH
POWER-TRAIN, INC., and
JACK H. WYNN,
Plaintiffs and
Appellants,

Case No. 14302

vs.
PAUL M. STUVER,
Defendant and
Respondent.
BRIEF

OF

A P P E L L A N T S

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an interlocutory appeal from an order granting
Respondents Motion to Dismiss the above-entitled action.
DISPOSITION OF CASE BY LOWER COURT
An order granting the Respondent's Motion to Dismiss
was entered on the 17th day of September, 197S.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellants seek to have the order of the trial court
dismissing the above-entitled action vacated and the cause
remanded for trial on the merits.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On November 1, 1974, Paul M. Stuver, Defendant-Respondent
herein, brought an action as plaintiff in the Superior Court

-1-
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of the State of California for the County of Humboldt, Docket

*

No. 56571, against Jack H. Wynn, Power-Train, Inc., PlaintiffsAppellants herein, and Does I through X inclusive.

The sole

and exclusive relief sought by Mr. Stuver as plaintiff in the
California action was the rescission of two assignment agreements.

The first agreement (Exhibit "A" in the California action,

Record 96), assigns from Mr. Stuver to Mr. Wynn Letters Patent
No. 3,090,363 in the United States Patent Office, pertaining
to a so-called "Mini-Sam11 fluid drive motor.

The second agreement

(Exhibit "B" in the California action, Record 103), assigns
from Mr. Stuver to Mr. Wynn all rights, including letters
patent, to a unique high volume, moderate pressure, radial
i
piston hydraulic pump and braking system which will compliment
the Power-Train ("Mini-Sam") motor..." Both agreements contain
provisions that they are to be "construed in accordance with
i

and governed by the laws of the State of Utah."
28).

(Record 21,

Mr. Stuver's complaint in the California action alleges
i

as grounds for rescission breach by Mr. Wynn, Power-Train,
and Does I through X of various provisions of the two assignment
agreements above-described, including, among others, covenants
by said defendants to pay certain cash amounts to Stuver, certain
expenses of Stuver, certain royalties and certain stock rights
in other corporations, and to employ Stuver to assist in the
production of the inventions to which he had assigned his rights.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Mr, Wynn and Power-Train, Inc., filed an answer as defendants to the California action on December 10, 1974.

It denied

generally the allegations of Mr. Stuver's complaint.

In addi-

tion, it set up as affirmative defenses Mr. Stuver's failure
to make a legally sufficient offer of restitution, failure
of constructive conditions of cooperation under the assignment
agreements, misrepresentations by Stuver with respect to the
legal integrity, performance and cost characteristics of the
inventions assigned, and a broadly worded affirmative defense
of "willful and wanton11 conduct by Mr. Stuver resulting in
harm to the defendants.

The Appellants' answer in the California

action contained no counterclaim.
On June 23, 1975, Appellants commenced this action
against the Respondent.

They based their prayer for damages

on fifteen separate counts of tortious conduct, ranging from
the Respondent's misrepresentations with respect to the inventions assigned, their manufacturing costs, etc., to tortious
interference with the Appellants' contract relations, interference with their prospective advantage, appropriation
of trad;

ecrets, industrial sabotage and champerty.
Thereafter, the Respondent filed his Motion to Dismiss

on the ground that the action pending in California involved
the same parties and the same issues and, therefore, the priority principal applied to the present action and required its
dismissal.
The trial court adopted the argument of the Respondent
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-3-

and dismissed this action on the grounds that all the allegations in Appellants' Complaint were properly compulsory counterclaims under California law, and as a matter of judicial

comity

to the California court, the Appellants' Complaint was dismissed.
I
(Record 83.)
ARGUMENT
POINT I
IF THE CALIFORNIA ACTION WERE FOUND TO INVOLVE THE
IDENTICAL PARTIES, ISSUES AND RELIEF AS THE PRESENT
ACTION SUCH FINDING WOULD NOT CONSTITUTE GROUNDS
FOR DISMISSING THE PRESENT ACTION.
The trial court has misapplied the familiar

Tl

priority

i

principal11 which states the general rule of law that the pendency of a prior action in a court of competent jurisdiction
within the same state, between identical parties, involving

i

the identical cause of action and seeking identical relief,
wherein all of the rights of the parties thereto may be fully
and finally determined, may be asserted as a grounds for dismissal.

1

4

Am. Jur. Abatement and Revival, Sec. 14.

But
The pendency of a prior suit in one state
cannot be pleaded in abatement or in bar
to a subsequent suit in another state
even though both suits are between the same
parties and upon the same cause of action....
[Although a] judgment rendered in one is, of
course, when pleaded, a bar to further
prosecution of the other action. (1 Am-Jur.
Abatement and Revival, Sec. 39.)
Chicago R.I. § P.R.Co. v. Schendel, 270 U.S. 611 (1927); Dodge
v- Superior Court, 139 Cal.178, 33 P.2d 695 (1934); Upton
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4

4

*

v. Heiselt Construction Co,, 3 Utah2d 170, 280 P.2d 971 (1955);
53 A.L.R. 1265; Restatement (Second) of Conflicts, Sec. 86.
There is no substantive distinction between "abatement'' and
"dismissal" of an action.

1 Am. Jur.2d Abatement and Revival,

Sec. 1.
The trial court based its dismissal of the present
action on the precise ground that there was an action pending
in another state, involving the same parties and the same issues,
which the authorities have universally held to be impermissible
grounds for dismissal.

This Court must, therefore, vacate

the order of the trial court dismissing the present action.
POINT II
A STAY OF THE PRESENT ACTION PENDING THE CONCLUSION
• .OT~THF~CALIFORNIA ACTION IS CLE"XRLY INAPPROPRIATE,
The issue of whether or not a stay of the present action
pending the conclusion of the California action is not directly
presented by this appeal.

The Respondent has not moved for

such relief and the trial court not awarded it.

But, in the

event that this Court should consider it necessary to first
determine whether or not a stay of the present action is appropriate before remanding this action for trial on the merits,
the Appellants will demonstrate that such relief is clearly
inappropriate.
A court of one state may, in its discretion, stay a
proceeding pending it before it on the ground that a case
involving the same parties and issues is pending in another
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

state.

Simmons v. Superior Court, 96 Cal-2d 119, 214 P.2d

844 (1950); 19 A.L.R.2d 301.

Such a stay is not available

to the moving party as a matter of right.

Coffey v. Coffey,

71 S.W.2d 141 (Mo. 1934).
The general rule empowering a court to stay a local
action pending the outcome of a foreign action and its rationale
are summarized in 19 A.L.R.2d 301, Sec. 2 at page 306:
While judicial comity owing to the courts of
other states in which the former litigation was pending is sometimes advanced as a reason for the exercise
of the power to stay the local proceedings, it is
apparent that it is not the principal or sole reason,
since if it were, the power would be exercised (as
it is not) unconditionally and under all circumstances.
The real or principal reason for the exercise
of the power, when it has been exercised, appears to
be the protection of the defendant from vexatious and
harassing litigation, where there is no legitimate
advantage which the plaintiff may gain by bringing
his suit in more than one jurisdiction....
Confirming that this is the rationale for the rule empowering
a court to stay a domestic proceeding pending the outcome of
a foreign proceeding is State v. Knehans, 31 S.W.2d 226 (Mo•
1930), wherein it was stated that:
The general rule has come to be that the defense
of a prior suit pending applies only when the plaintiff
in both suits is the same and both are commenced by
himself and not to cross-suits by the plaintiff in
one wrho is the defendant in the other.
It is plain, then, that the principal reason for empower
courts to stay a local action pending the outcome of the same
action in a foreign jurisdiction is to control the potential
harrassment to which a defendant may be subjected by a plaintiff
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Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

who proliferates suits against him in various jurisdictions
in bad faith.

It plainly follows that the rationale for the

rule applies with less force to the situation where the plaintiff
in the domestic action is the defendant in the foreign action.
An additional subordinate rationale for empowering courts to
stay local actions pending the outcome of foreign actions is
to promote judicial economy by discouraging redundant suits.
When to authorize a stay of a local action is a policy
question, and its proper application is not susceptible to
generalized rules.

Application of. that policy depends almost

entirely upon the facts of the individual case. Muir v. Robinson,
205 Ind. 293, 186 N.E. 289 (1933).

Courts have, however,

devised some generally accepted tests to determine when a
subsequent local suit has no legitimate basis as-a separate
action and is, therefore, considered vexatious.

For the priority

principal to apply, it is deemed necessary that the two actions
be between identical parties, Kirkpatrick v. Eastern
Milling and Export Co., 135 F. 144 (D.C. N.J. 1904), that they
involve identical issues, Slade v. Dickinson, 82 F.Supp. 416
(D.C. Mich. 1949); Pesquera Del Pacifico S. De P.L. v. Superior
Court, 89 Cal.2d 738, 201 P.2d 553 (1949); Chappel v. Chappel,
186 Misc. 968, 60 N.Y.S.2d 447 (1945); Sullivan v. Sullivan,
71 N.Y.S.2d 120 (1947); and request the same relief, Disbrow
Mfg. Co. v. Creamery Package Mfg. Co., 115 Minn. 434, 132 N.W.
-7Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

i
915 (1911), such that a decision in one action will render
all issues in the other res judicata.
The foregoing test of identity of parties, issues and

"

relief is the one employed when applying the principal of res'
judicata generally.

Essentially

the same test, however, is

used for determining whether an abatement or stay is appropriate
under the priority principal

and for determining whether a

counterclaim is compulsory or permissive.

Where the prerequisites

of identity of parties, issues and relief are satisfied, the
trial court is deemed empowered to stay a local action on the
grounds of a prior pending foreign suit.

Chadwick v. Gill,

16 Del. 127, 141 A. 618 (1927); 19 A.L.R.2d 301, 307-08.
The question

i

that must be answered in determining

whether a stay of the present action is appropriate is, therefore, whether ail of the allegations of the Appellants1 complaint
in the present action are properly defined as compulsory counterclaims in the California action.
4
The California Rules of Civil Procedure, Sec. 426.60
state:
(a) Except as otherwise provided by statute, if a
party against whom a complaint has been filed and
served fails to allege in a cross-complaint any
related cause of action which (at the time of serving
his answer to the complaint) he has against the
plaintiff, such party may not thereafter in any
other action assert against the plaintiff the related
cause of action.
Section 426.10(c) clarifies what is meant by "any related cause
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

<

i

of action/'

It states:

''Related cause of action11 means a cause of action
which arises out of the same transaction, occurrence
or series of transactions or occurrences as the
cause of action which the plaintiff alleges in
his complaint.
In deciding whether all of the allegations of Appellants'
Complaint filed in the present action would be compulsory or permissive counterclaims in the California action, the key phrase
that must be defined is "arises out of the same transaction,
occurrence or series of transactions or occurrences as the cause
of action which the plaintiff alleges in his complaint."

Under

authoritative definitions of the phrase "same transaction or
occurrence" as it is used in the California and similiar compulso
counterclaim statutes, it cannot be maintained that all of
the allegations contained in the Appellants' Complaint in the
present action would constitute compulsory counterclaims in
the California action.
Knapp v. Knapp, 15 Cal.2d 237, 100 P.2d 759 (1943)
illustrates how the "same transaction" test is to be applied.
There the plaintiff brought an action seeking to share in the
proceeds from the sale of land in which he and the defendant
each owned an undivided one-half interest, the defendant holding
the plaintiff's share for him as trustee.
The plaintiff had left the state where the land was
located for an extended period.

The defendant eventually sent

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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him a promissory note in the amount of $2,000.00 bearing the
following inscription:

"In full settlement for (plaintiff's)

interest in the Cucamunga, California orange grove which was
owned by payor and payee."

j

The plaintiff alleged that the

note was part of a scheme by the defendant to abscond entirely
with the proceeds of the sale of the parcel which actually

'

amounted to $10,000.00.
The defendant argued that a prior pending suit brought
by the plaintiff to recover on the note constituted a suit
on the same cause of action and,' therefore, the failure of the
plaintiff to assert his claim for fraud at that time should
bar his subsequent suit for fraud.
The court held the cause of action on the note itself
to be separate from the cause of action for fraud and that,
therefore, the plaintiff's prior action to recover on the note
would not operate to bar his action for.fraud though it was closely
connected with the note.
Big Cola v. World Bottling Co., 134 F.2d 718 (6th Cir.
1943) contains an instructive definition of the phrase "sametransaction or occurrence" as employed in a compulsory counterclaim
statute then in force.

There the plaintiff granted the defendant

a contractual right to manufacture a soft drink concentrate
according to the plaintiff's secret formula, as well as the
i

exclusive right to use a registered name in the sale of the
-10-
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concentrate.

Defendant thereafter expended money and effort

in promotional work and advertising in many states. The plaintiff
asked for a determination that the contract was void.

The

defendant's answer asserted the validity of the contract, but
asserted no counterclaim.
The defendant to the former action subsequently brought
an independent action against the plaintiff in the former action
seeking damages on the ground of implied contract.

The defendant

(plaintiff in the former action) moved for abatement of the
subsequent action on the ground that it involved the same cause
of action which was the basis of the prior suit, that plaintiff's
claims were properly compulsory counterclaims in the prior
suit and could not now serve as the basis of an independent
action.
The court held that the plaintiff's cause of action
on implied contract did not "arise out of the transaction or
occurrence that is the subject-matter of the opposing party's
claim/1 that it was, therefore, a permissive counterclaim
which the plaintiff was not obliged to plead in the former
suit and was now free to assert as the basis of an independent
action.
Kerby v. State, 62 Ariz. 294,157 P.2d 698 (1945) contains another instructive application of the "same transaction
or occurrence" test as employed in interpreting a compulsory
-11-
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<

counterclaim statute.

There the secretary of state had previously

A

brought an action in mandamus against the state auditor requiring
the auditor to pay his accrued salary then being withheld by
the auditor on the ground of illegal payments made by the
secretary of state.

I

Subsequently, the auditor brought an action

against the secretary of state to recover the expenditures
illegally made.

The secretary argued that the auditor's claim

4

arose from the same transaction or occurrence which was the
subject matter of the prior suit in mandamus, that it was,
therefore, a compulsory counterclaim in the prior suit and

i

could not now serve as the basis of an independent action.
The court held that Arizona's counterclaim statute did
not apply to bar the auditor's claim since it did not arise

I

from the same transaction or occurrence which was the subject
matter of the secretary's action in mandamus.
Another instructive application of the Msame transaction

•

or occurrence" test for determining whether a counterclaim
is compulsory or permissive is found in Capetillo v. Burress
and Rogers, 202 S.W.2d 953 (Tex. 1947).

Capetillo was an action

*

brought by plaintiff for damages for wrongful sequestration
of his truck by the defendants.

Defendants had previously

brought an action against the plaintiff to foreclose a chattel

^

mortgage on his truck, causing the truck to be repossessed and
held for charges.

The defendants moved to abate the plaintiff's

I
-12Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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action for wrongful sequestration on the grounds that it arose
out of the same transaction which was the subject matter of
the prior suit for foreclosure, and was, therefore, properly
a compulsory counterclaim in the prior action.

The court

rejected the defendants1 argument, holding that the plaintiff's
wrongful sequestration action was a question of abuse of court
process and, as such, did not arise out of the transaction
upon which the foreclosure suit was based.

It therefore held

that the Texas compulsory counterclaim statute was not a bar
to the plaintiff's wrongful sequestration action.
Williams v. Robinson, 1 F.R.D. 211 CD.D.C. 1940) also
illustrates the proper application of the "same transaction or
occurrence" test to the issue of whether a counterclaim is
properly defined as compulsory or permissive.

There the wife

of the defendant had previously brought an action against him
for divorce.

In the previous action the defendant had cross-

complained for absolute divorce from his wife on grounds of
adultery, naming the plaintiff in the principal case as co-respondent.
The answer filed by the plaintiff in the principal case to
the husband's cross-complaint in the prior action was limited
to a general denial of the allegation of adultery.
Thereafter, the plaintiff in the principal case brought
an action against the defendant husband

for libel and slander.

The defendant moved to dismiss the plaintiff's complaint on
the grounds that the defendant had failed to assert it as a
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

{

i

counterclaim in the prior action for divorce as required by
Rule 13(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and was

~

now precluded from basing a separate action thereon.

'

The court rejected the defendant's argument, holding
that the slander and libel of which the plaintiff complained
was not part and parcel of the transaction or occurrence that

^

was the subject matter of the defendant husband's cross-complaint
in the previous action for divorce and consequently the plaintiff's
libel and slander action must be considered a permissive rather
than a compulsory counterclaim.
Knapp, Big Cola, Capetillo, and Williams, forcefully
illustrate that a cause of action will not be deemed to have
arisen from the "same transaction or occurrence" which was the
subject matter of an opposing party's cause of action merely
because a relationship can be shown between the respective
"transactions."

They illustrate that a close analysis of the

respective "transactions" is required in order to determine
whether those transactions raise common questions of law sufficient
to justify a requirement that those questions be determined
in a single proceeding.
Specifically with respect to contract actions, the
authorities have established that certain causes of action
in contract are to be defined as separate from others though
the subject matter of both may be the same contract.
-14-
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Many

<

authorities hold, for example, that actions to enforce rights
under a contract are properly defined as causes of action separate
from actions to reform, rescind or cancel the same contract.
For example in National Fire Insurance Company v. Hughes,
81 N.E. 563 (1907), an insurer brought an action to reform
a fire insurance policy on the grounds of mutual mistake in
the description of the insured structures.

There was an appeal

pending from a prior suit by the insured seeking recovery under
the policy.

The insured argued that his prior pending suit

on the policy was based on the same cause of action as the
principal suit by the insurer for reformation and, therefore,
should bar the subsequent suit by the insurer.
The court held that the cause of action in reformation
was distinct from the cause of action at law to recover on the
policy, though both causes of action related to the same contract.

Accord, Knapp v. Knapp, 15 Cal.2d 237, 100 P.2d 759

(1943); State v. Knehans, 31 S.W.2d 226 (Mo. 1930);

Strike

v. Floor, 97 Utah 265, 92 P.2d 867 (1939); Western § Southern
Life Ins. Co. v. Brenna, 275 Mich. 19, 265 N.W. 512 (1936).
In summary, the authorities state that a defendant's
claims against a plaintiff, before they may be defined as compulsory
counterclaims, must not only be related to the transaction or
occurrence upon which the plaintiff1s claims against the defendant are based, but must also be closely analyzed to determine
-16-
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i

if they raise common questions of law that would justify requiring
all of the defendant's claims to be adjudicated in the proceeding
brought by the plaintiff.

This is particularly true in actions

confined to the question of rescission, cancellation or reformation
of contracts.
The contract case cited in the Memorandum of the Respondent
4

in Support of his Motion to Dismiss does not undermine these
conclusions.

In Brunswick Drug Co. v. Springer, 130 P.2d 758

(Cal. 1942), cited by the Respondent (Record 85), the complaint
4
therein simultaneously asserted causes of action for rescission
and damages under the contract upon which the action was based.
Under those circumstances, there is little question that the
i
defendant's own claims for damages under the same contract
were held to be compulsory counterclaims.
Furthermore, the cases cited in said Memorandum of the
i

Respondent wherein local actions were stayed on the ground of
prior pending foreign actions involving the same parties and
the same issues for reasons of judicial "comity" must be considered
4

to represent a minority view.

As previously noted, if comity

were truely the rationale upon which the priority principal
is based, the authority of a court to stay a local action pending
the conclusion of an action in a foreign state would be a mandatory
duty rather than a discretionary power, which the authorities
unanimously state it is not.

(See authorities cited page 6, supra.)
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The question of whether a stay of the present action
would be appropriate, then, can only be determined by a close
examination of the pleadings in the respective actions.

Notice

should first be taken of the factors distinguishing the California
action from the present action.

There is not a strict identity

of parties, the California action naming Does I through X as
defendants while there are no such parties named in the present
action.

Two assignment agreements constitute the subject

matter of the California action, while the subject matter of
the present action is the tortious acts of the Respondent,
some related to the agreements upon which the California action
is based and some unrelated.

The relief sought in the California

action is limited to rescission and restitution, while the
relief sought in the present action is limited to damages and
an accounting.
The fact that the prerequisites, of identity of parties
and of relief sought are lacking in the present action tends
to reinforce Appellants' contention that the claims asserted
in their Complaint herein would be permissive rather than compulsory
counterclaims in the California action,but the absence of those
prerequisites is not dispositive.

The respective pleadings

must be further analyzed to determine whether all of the Appellants1
alleged causes of action arose from the "same transaction or
occurrence

which is the subject matter of the CRespondentfs)
-18-
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{

Complaint" in the California action.

It must be concluded

<

that they do not.
The action brought by Respondent as plaintiff in the
(

California Superior Court seeks rescission of the assignment
agreements, (Exhibits "A" and "B" in the California action, Record
96, 103), and restitution, but seeks no other relief.

The

issues raised by Respondent's Complaint, as previously described

A

in Appellants1 Statement of Facts, are the performance or
non-performance of the respective parties of those assignment
agreements as that relates to the Respondents right to rescind.

i

The affirmative defenses contained in the Appellants1 answer
raised the issues of misrepresentation by the Respondent pertaining
to the inventions assigned, his intentional obstruction of

^

Appellants1 business operations and other "willful and wanton"
conduct as such conduct may relate to failure of constructive
conditions of cooperation under the agreements.
in their Answer made no counterclaim.

Appellants

In summary, the "subject-matter"

of the California action is the two assignment agreements
described herein.

The "transactions or occurrences" arising

therefrom are the performance or non-performance of those
agreements as they relate to Mr. Stuver's right to the equitable
remedy of rescission.
In contrast, the action brought by Appellants as Plaintiffs
in the Utah District Court is an action in tort, seeking damages
and an accounting for fifteen (15) separate counts of tortious
-19-
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conduct by the Respondent.

They include misrepresentations

by Respondent as to the integrity of the patent assigned (Count
I and II of Appellants1 Complaint), the performance characteristics
of the inventions assigned (Count XIII) and their manufacturing
costs (Count V).

Such conduct may be considered "transactions

or occurrences" related to the two assignment agreements which
constitute the "subject-matter" of the California action and
may, therefore, be considered to "arise therefrom."
But Appellants' Complaint also includes allegations
of champerty (Count XIV), tortious interference with Appellants1
contract relations with its customers (Count >'.(Y), with its
prospective advantage with future customers (Count VIII) and
an accounting for profits realize, from crade secrets appropriated
by the Respondent (Count XV).

Such conduct can be considered

to have only t,,e most strained and incidental relationship
to the two assignment agreements which constitute the "subject-matter"
of the California action, and the conclusion that they "arise
therefrom" and therefore constitute compulsory counterclaims
under the California statutes is simply untenable.
For example, the Appellants1 claim that the Respondent
has tortiously interfered with its prospective advantage, and
his claim that the Respondent has conducted industrial sabotage
has little bearing on the question of the performance or nonperformance of the respective parties of the assignment

agree-

ments as that relates to Respondent's right to rescind.

They
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i

do not constitute a defense to the Respondent's claim for
rescission and would not be affected by a determination that
the Respondent has such right.

Therefore, these allegations

in Appellants1 Complaint must considered permissive rather

i

than compulsory counterclaims had they been filed in the California
action for rescission.

Least of all can the question of champerty

by the Respondent be thought to relate to the Respondent's
right to rescind or the lack thereof.

*

It presents an entirely

distinct question of abuse of court process and would therefore
constitute a permissive rather than a compulsory counterclaim
in the California action.

*

Capet^llo v. Buress and Rogers,

202 S.W.2d 953 (Tex. 1947); Williams v. Robinson, 1 F.R.D.
211 (D.D.C. 1940).

i

It is clear that Appellants1 Complaint includes several
allegations that can, at most, be considered permissive counterclaims had they been asserted in the California action.

As per-

|

missive counterclaims, the right of Appellants to bring a
separate action thereon is uncontestable.

This Court should,

therefore, not only vacate the Order of the trial court, dismissing

i

the present action, but should remand this cause for trial on
the merits.
CONCLUSION

I

The Order of the trial court dismissing the present
action contravenes the universally accepted rule that the
<
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pendency of a prior suit in the one state cannot be pleaded
in abatement or in bar to a subsequent suit in another state,
even where both suits are brought between identical parties,
upon identical causes of action and seek identical relief.
The Order of the trial court must, therefore, be vacated.
A stay of the present action pending the outcome of
the California action is clearly inappropriate inasmuch as the
Appellants' Complaint includes several causes of action that would,
at best, have been permissive counterclaims if asserted in the
California action.

This Court should, therefore, remand this

cause for trial on the merits.
Respectfully submitted,

ORRIN G. HATCH
420 Continental Bank Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Attorney for Appellants
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